The Foreign Service Journal, March 2010

M A R C H 2 0 1 0 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 13 O n March 6, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton presented Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov with a token of her commitment to improv- ing relations: a “reset” button. Al- though the word engraved on the gift, “peregruzka,” actually means “over- charge” or “overload” (depending on the context), Lavrov gamely pressed the button alongside Clinton. Just four months later, however, Vice President Joe Biden used a speech to the Georgian Parliament to proclaim a U.S. commitment to bring- ing both Georgia and Ukraine into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In so doing, he may have intended to blunt attacks from Republicans by mimicking earlier denunciations of the “Evil Empire,” such as those for- mer Vice President Richard Cheney and former President Ronald Reagan routinely delivered. But while such rhetoric still res- onates with much of the American public, it does not serve our larger na- tional interests. At a minimum, the vice president reinforced the skepti- cism of nationalist Russians that America sincerely wants closer ties. He also complicated the task of our negotiators on a variety of critical is- sues by inducing Moscow to wonder who really speaks for the Obama ad- ministration. Sec. Clinton performed deft dam- age control, reassuring Russia that the United States still regards it as a great power and is not trying to use the newly independent states of the “Near Abroad” to contain it. But if this is some “good cop, bad cop” strat- egy for dealing with Moscow, it un- derestimates their intelligence and their visceral toughness. Speaking as a diplomat who spent nine years in Moscow, both before and after the collapse of communism, I can attest to the folly of assuming that we will get our way on these issues just be- cause we’re the last superpower standing. The Near Abroad and NATO Words have consequences. Our pledge to help Georgia and Ukraine bring their military forces up to speed to qualify for NATO membership im- plies a commitment of support in the event of conflict with Russia in accor- dance with Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. It also encourages the leader- ship of those nations to overestimate the support they can expect from the West for their own domestic agendas. We may be sure that if Moscow perceives any state on its border to be closely allied with the West, it will do what it can to destabilize that state — and it is in a much better position to do so than we are to defend it. We are not dealing with the prostrate, rela- tively cooperative Russia led by Boris Yeltsin, but a bitter, much stronger power that feels the West took advan- tage of its weakness during the 1990s to extract concessions, without offer- ing anything tangible in return. And it is fiercely determined to defend what it sees as its national security interests in the Near Abroad. With this in mind, the Obama ad- ministration’s declarations and actions should explicitly reassure Moscow that: • We are as concerned as Russia is about the prospect of instability in the region. • The only interest Americans have in the Near Abroad is in pro- moting genuine sovereignty and pros- perity. • It is in Russia’s own interest to do everything it can to demonstrate that it wants to turn over a new leaf in re- lations with its neighbors. • We want Moscow to play a major A Real Reset Button for U.S.-Russian Relations B Y T HOMPSON B UCHANAN S PEAKING O UT It is imperative to devise a formula to insulate the Near Abroad from a damaging rivalry between Moscow and NATO.