The Foreign Service Journal, March 2010

14 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 1 0 role in ensuring peace and stability along its borders, and in helping us address major problems throughout the world. The issue is not whether we sup- port the sovereignty of these newly independent states. Of course we do. But let us identify the wisest ways to protect both their interests and ours. Some Progress on Resetting Relations A number of positive steps have been taken by both sides to “reset” re- lations, although each side’s under- standing of what that means is rather different. For some Russians, at least, it means that the Americans should accept Moscow’s positions on a whole range of issues. And that is certainly not what we mean by the term. A first positive step was President Barack Obama’s decision to rethink the policy of missile defense installa- tions in Eastern Europe, one that lacked logic in the eyes of our NATO allies and many Americans. In- evitably, the Central Europeans ac- cused us of giving in to Moscow, and the U.S. political opposition quickly labeled the administration “soft on na- tional security.” But the decision con- tributed to the relative success of the U.S.-Russia summit in July 2009, and to Moscow’s more positive attitude since then. On the issue of Iran, President Dmitry Medvedev has appeared more forthcoming than Prime Minis- ter Vladimir Putin, accepting at least the possibility that sanctions may be necessary if Tehran continues to move ahead with its nuclear program. Moscow is also allowing U.S. troops and supplies to transit Russia in sup- port of the war in Afghanistan, and there has been some talk of broader cooperation there. More discouraging, while the at- mosphere for arms control negotia- tions has been positive, the two sides remain stymied by technical issues re- lated to maintaining a balance of power — a consideration that has al- ways bedeviled these talks. Setting Realistic Priorities Regrettably, Moscow shows no signs of abandoning its traditional be- lief that the only real security lies in domination of its neighbors. But that only makes it more imperative for us to devise a formula to insulate the border states from a damaging rivalry between Russia and NATO. Formal arrangements that ad- dressed the problem of conflicting territorial interests in the past — like Austrian neutrality, or the old Rapacki Plan for Central Europe — are proba- bly non-starters. But we should at least try to come to some understanding with Moscow that the Near Abroad is not a sphere of influence for any single state, but a showcase for joint concern and mutual restraint. It would be politically suicidal for the Obama administration to formally withdraw its support for NATO ex- pansion into Georgia and Ukraine, particularly in light of its decision to abandon plans to install missile de- fense systems in Central Europe. But we should at least stop talking about it and leave it to the Europeans to make clear that the idea is a non- starter. At an appropriate moment in on- going talks over some related issue like the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, perhaps our envoys could informally float the idea of neu- tralizing the Near Abroad as an area of competition, with a clear under- standing that this would mean non-in- terference by either side in the domestic politics of the region. Of course, we would need to per- suade Tbilisi and Kyiv that their secu- rity would be best protected by an understanding between Moscow and Washington. Toward that end, Geor- gia, Ukraine and Russia should be en- couraged to discuss their overall economic relations, which are in so many ways complementary and have been historically profitable. As the dominant power in the re- gion, Moscow should take the initia- tive in pursuit of better relations, removing obstacles it has imposed in areas like the import of Georgian wine and vegetables. Concessions are also needed on the part of both Gazprom and Kyiv regarding the tran- sit of oil and gas through Ukraine. In addition, the U.S. should pro- vide targeted foreign assistance. The aim of these steps would be to demonstrate that there are concrete benefits to be gained from Russo- American cooperation in the region. On the issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we need to encourage Tbilisi to recognize that it would re- S P E A K I N G O U T Regrettably, Russia still believes that the only real security lies in dominating its neighbors.