The Foreign Service Journal, April 2007

operate. Television and print jour- nalists have been co-opted, while those who openly oppose the regime have come under considerable pres- sure to avoid criticizing the Kremlin. His bureaucratic mind-set also helps explain his approach to issues such as legal reform, the military and even Chechnya. Once he has come up with a structural paradigm for meeting such challenges, he then expects the rest of the system to fall into line. Indeed, for him the answer to many questions comes in the form of structural modifi- cations. In the aftermath of the horrific September 2004 terrorist attack on a school in Beslan, he cited security failures on the part of local officials to push through national legislation giving him the authority to appoint provincial governors, instead of their standing for elec- tion. The situation with the judiciary is similar. Putin has introduced a number of reforms that encourage the use of the legal system to resolve disputes. The difficulty is that when legal issues involve important matters of state, they are manipulated to ensure that the Kremlin gets its way. The same strategy characterizes Putin’s tightening control over both of Russia’s key legislative organs — the Duma (Parliament) and the Federation Council, which was set up to represent the regions (somewhat similar in theory to the U.S. Senate). It did not take Putin long to maneuver himself into effective control of the Duma, first by marginalizing those who opposed him, such as the communists, and then by establishing a new political grouping, the Unity Party. Its members sometimes crit- icize the Kremlin publicly, but when it comes to votes on critical issues, Putin nearly always gets what he wants. As he did with governors, Putin substantially in- creased Moscow’s leverage in determining which local officials serve on the Federation Council. Through such measures he quickly undermined the independence of the legislative branch and weakened local government organs. Another step Putin has taken has been to create what Emory University political scientist Tom Remington calls “parallel parliaments”: organizations such as the State Council, the Public Chamber and the Council for the Realization of Priority National Projects. While these organizations, made up of individuals from differ- ent walks of life, advise the president on matters of public policy, and he even meets with them on occasion, they cannot compel him to do any- thing. The Importance of Culture A second and equally important factor influencing Putin’s thinking is Russian political culture. While he has not used the term, he has made use of the concept. For example, when asked if Russia planned to imitate the Chinese model (i.e., economic liberalization with minimal political freedom), he categorically ruled that out. When asked why, he responded, “Because we have a different culture. After all, Russia is a country of European culture.” On another occasion Putin commented, “Russia is a country that, by the will of its people, chose democracy for itself. It set out on this course itself and, observing all generally accepted political norms, will decide for itself how to ensure that the principles of freedom and democracy are implemented, taking into account its his- torical, geographical and other characteristics.” To paraphrase Stalin’s remark regarding the introduc- tion of communism in Poland, Putin believes Western democracy would fit the Russian people like a saddle fits a cow. He openly expressed his doubts about the applic- ability of the Western experience in Russia in his Millennium Speech of January 2000: “It will not happen soon, if it ever happens at all, that Russia will become the second edition of, say, the U.S. or Britain, in which liberal values have deep historical tra- ditions. Our state and its institutions have always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country and its people. For Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly that should be gotten rid of. Quite the contrary, they see it as a source and guarantor of order and the ini- tiator and main driving force of any change.” In essence, that describes exactly what Putin has been doing since he took office: strengthening state authority while permitting freedom — but only to the extent that it does not get in the way of the efficient functioning of the country’s bureaucratic structures. And he may well F O C U S A P R I L 2 0 0 7 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 21 The Kremlin’s message to the West is clear: I may not be as strong as you, but I can be a nuisance if you ignore me.