The Foreign Service Journal, April 2007

be right that this is what the average Russian wants: A public poll conducted in November 2006 found Putin’s approval rating was 81 percent. Indeed, his approval rat- ing for most of the past seven years has hovered around 70 to 80 percent. Very few politicians anywhere in the world can claim so high a level of public support. Putin the Pragmatist This brings me to the third factor that plays a major role in Putin’s decisionmaking approach: his nonideolog- ical attitude. To quote his Millennium Speech again: “I am against the restoration of an official state ideology in Russia in any form.” Instead, the key question for Putin is “Does it work?” If the answer is yes, then do it that way. And if Plan A doesn’t work, then try Plan B; every- thing is on the table. Frankly, this, too, should not come as a surprise. When it came to problem-solving, the KGB was one of the least ideological organizations in the Soviet Union. The task was always to get the job done, to solve the problem at hand. Based on his conversations with KGB agents over the years, this writer has formed the impres- sion that, while they believed they were the “sword and shield” of the state, they saw their primary task as solving the problems given to them by the “center.” Similarly, for all his carping at U.S. foreign policy, it should not be forgotten that Putin was also the first for- eign leader to call George Bush following the 9/11 attacks to express his sympathy for the American public. And when the Russian military dragged its feet on pro- viding the Americans with intelligence information on Afghanistan, he went to the Defense Ministry on Sept. 24, 2001 — just prior to his first visit to President Bush’s Crawford ranch — to press them to be more forthcom- ing. It is therefore no accident that Putin was invited back to Crawford several more times, though it is ques- tionable whether he will receive another invitation given his harsher criticism of the U.S. recently. The fourth characteristic of Putin’s approach to polit- ical and economic problems is that he is not a long- range, conceptual planner. His focus tends to be on immediate issues, just as it was when he was in the KGB. This helps explain why he never came up with a careful- ly thought-out, long-range plan for solving the country’s chronic economic problems. Instead, his focus has been on specific issues such as raising the price of oil, getting rid of obnoxious oligarchs, or forcing generals to go along with his ideas about military reform. Yet such steps have contributed to Russia’s increas- ingly important role in the world. The country no longer owes any external debt. And with the price of gas going through the roof, Putin has used Russia’s newfound eco- nomic strength to assert himself vis-a-vis Europe, which badly needs Russia’s oil. He also raised the price Moscow charges Ukraine, Belarus and other former allies, conveying a simple message: “If you want to go your own way, have a good time. But don’t expect us to subsidize your economy.” The same capitalist zeal characterizes his policy toward Iran, where Moscow has major economic invest- ments worth billions of dollars. Though very hesitant to jeopardize those stakes, Putin eventually agreed to weak sanctions against Tehran for allegedly pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. But he did so only after speaking personally with Bush to make it clear that Moscow would never approve military action against Iran. Authoritarianism Without Repression? So what should we call Putin’s form of governance? No label, especially one taken from another political sys- tem, would fit the Russian system exactly. No two cul- tures are exactly the same, and culture usually gives rise to the form of governance in a country. Thus, to be effective, a system of governance must fit the political beliefs and attitudes of the people. However, the factors I have been discussing — Putin’s preference for reliance on the state, his nonideo- logical approach, his pragmatic attitude, his belief in the importance of Russian political culture, and his cautious, incremental approach to problem-solving — all suggest that the term “authoritarianism without repression” may fit his style best. As Putin sees things, he was unexpectedly given the task of trying to bring Russia out of the mess he found it in when he came to power in 2000. He shouldered that responsibility and is trying to solve Russia’s many prob- lems as he “manages” the country. He fears that if he does not impose order through the power of the state, Russia will collapse into anarchy during the current “time of troubles.” He may be wrong about that, but he sees no alternative. This is why he was prepared to jail billionaire Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Putin made it clear early on that he would not permit those who had gained tremendous F O C U S 22 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 7