The Foreign Service Journal, April 2009

A P R I L 2 0 0 9 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 31 keep Bulgaria’s factories running. The development of a sustainable, mutually beneficial relationship with Russia — which conceivably could help address these challenges — remains one of the most vital pieces of unfinished business on NATO’s post–Cold War “to do” list. Yet too often the Alliance’s instinctive reaction to any crisis in that and other relationships has been to re- strict, rather than intensify, engagement. The August 2008 declaration that there would be “no business as usual” with Russia in the context of last summer’s crisis in the Cauca- sus did little beyond depriving the Allies of an important forum in which to voice concerns over Russian actions. It complicated efforts to strengthen NATO-Russia coopera- tion on Afghanistan, and led (indirectly) to a more difficult operating environment for U.S. and NATO forces in Cen- tral Asia. Restoration of NATO-Russia ties was inevitable, and is already under way. In the months to come, the Al- lies would do well to take steps to ensure that this key part- nership functions in good times and in bad, and that rhetoric does not outstrip the will to act. Article 5 in Perspective Such an effort will not be easy, particularly since the re- cent trend has been toward a more confrontational ap- proach. The upcoming summit has prompted calls from many quarters for revisiting NATO’s 10-year-old Strategic Concept, to place greater emphasis on the “core business” of Article 5 territorial defense (and, by implication, less on both crisis management and partnership). This was clearly evident the last time NATO’s leaders met, in April 2008 in Bucharest. They proclaimed a strong collective defense “the core purpose of our Alliance and … our most impor- tant security task” (in contrast to the Strategic Concept it- self, which puts “deterrence and defense” on an equal footing with security, consultation, crisis management and partnership). The current penchant for Article 5 has many causes. Some would like to upgrade terrorism, currently classified as a mere subject of “consultation,” to an Article 5 threat. Turkey was unnerved by the slow Allied response to its re- quest for Patriot anti-missile batteries in the run-up to the F O C U S