The Foreign Service Journal, April 2009

32 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 9 2003 Iraq War, and would like to see greater “automaticity” in Article 5 contingencies. In Central and East- ern Europe, some newer Allies want to reassure their publics in the context of an increasingly assertive Russia. Given these mixed motives, NATO should tread carefully in this area, avoiding symbolic steps that will have little military value, but might exacerbate further already difficult relations with Russia. As the Alliance enters its seventh decade, it must decide whether the current mix of practical programs and geo- graphic pigeonholes that characterize its partnership arrangements is appropriate to today’s world — a world where NATO needs its partners at least as much as those partners need the Alliance. It must consider carefully the particular challenges inherent in offering a membership prospect to aspirants like Georgia and Ukraine, and whether adjustments need to be made to the tools and pace of the enlargement process. NATOmust maintain a “heli- copter view” of how individual decisions fit together, and how they affect the broader security environment in which NATO must operate. How would Ukraine’s NATO mem- bership, for example, affect the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, or current intelligence- and technology-shar- ing agreements between Moscow and Kyiv? Can Russian concerns about eventual NATO military bases in the Cau- casus be addressed through arms control mechanisms? More forthcoming answers to such questions, accompanied by more energetic efforts to develop joint NATO-Russia capabilities and operations, could help break the current deadlock, producing a win-win-win scenario for NATO, as- pirants and Russia. NATO must also acknowledge that the Alliance itself cannot operate in a vacuum — in executing its operations and in promoting its partnership goals, NATO and its mem- ber states can and should work more closely with (and through) the U.N., the E.U., the OSCE and other institu- tional frameworks. Strengthened cooperation with the E.U., in particular, could enhance the effectiveness of both organizations, eliminating wasteful duplication of effort. It could also keep “soft” security issues like energy on the agenda, and make key European allies more amenable to moving past outdated geographic and substantive taboos that inhibit NATO’s ability to adapt to global challenges. And it could help promote a more coherent Western vision of where Russia can and should fit into the Euro-Atlantic security landscape. Some steps have been taken in this re- gard, but much more remains to be done. The Importance of the OSCE The other “external” process that de- serves NATO’s urgent attention is the rejuvenation of the OSCE as a forum for serious engagement with Russia and other partners. LastDecember inHelsinki, responding to an initiative by PresidentDmitryMedvedev, OSCE foreignmin- isters held an initial debate on the future of European secu- rity. NATOwelcomed this process, declaring that “Allies are open to dialogue within the OSCE on security perceptions and how to respond to new threats.” If Russia’s intent was to focus such a debate on urgent is- sues of “hard” politico-military security, for the over- whelming majority of the 50 ministers who took part the Helsinki debate represented a rediscovery of the OSCE’s signature concept of comprehensive, multidimensional se- curity. Under this concept, security is rooted not only in politico-military transparency, but also in economic oppor- tunity, effective democratic governance and the dignity of the individual. The concept was ahead of its time in 1975, when the Helsinki Final Act was agreed, and it remains sharply relevant today, as President Obama and Secretary Clinton work to reinvigorate U.S. moral, as well as political, leadership. In the cross-dimensional currency of the OSCE, deepened U.S. and NATO engagement in shoring up the foundations of military transparency and pre- dictability (for instance, by working with Russia to revive the moribund CFE Treaty and to address Moscow’s con- cerns about U.S. missile defense plans) can build leverage to promote progress on U.S. priorities in the economic (e.g., energy) and human dimensions. To borrow a phrase from the president’s inaugural ad- dress, the U.S. and its allies should “reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals.” Isolating Russia in the name of defending our values will achieve little. But deeper engagement in the Nato-Russia Council and in the OSCE will greatly enhance our ability to help ordinary people, from Georgia to Afghanistan to Russia itself, live in freedom and dignity. Washington should see a revitalized NATO and a reanimated OSCE as two pillars of a single, coherent European and global security strategy. F O C U S To succeed in Afghanistan, NATO will need the active support of Kabul’s neighbors, and of Russia.