The Foreign Service Journal, May 2005

position. U.S. policy ultimately sacrificed official relations with Taiwan and ended the defense treaty with this loyal ally for the sake of the benefits to be derived from official relations with the PRC. Reacting to Tiananmen Square Partisan interests and the influence of constituent groups played a greater role in the U.S.- China policy debate of the 1990s, after the Tiananmen crackdown and the end of the Cold War. But major features of the debate were markedly different from the debate in the 1970s and early 1980s. First of all, policy-makers in the executive branch and Congress shared confidence in American power and influence in the world, especially once the Soviet empire had collapsed — a marked contrast from the strategic uncertainty that underlined the U.S. policy debate in the 1970s and early 1980s. In contrast to the 1970s, when U.S. officials faced and made major sacrifices in pursuit of U.S. policy toward the PRC, the protagonists in the China policy debate after the Cold War had little inclination to sac- rifice tangible U.S. interests for the sake of their pre- ferred stance. Thus, those in Congress, the media and elsewhere in U.S. domestic politics who were vocal in seeking an upgrading in U.S. treatment for Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui, demanding he be granted a visa to visit Cornell University in 1995, largely fell silent when Beijing reacted to the visit with forceful actions in the Taiwan Strait that posed a serious danger of U.S.- Chinese military confrontation. Similarly, the majority of congressional members opposing the annual waiver granting continued most-favored-nation tariff treat- ment to Chinese imports had no real intention of cut- ting off bilateral trade. They often explained that they were merely endeavoring to send a signal to the admin- istration and to China over their dissatisfaction with the policies of both governments. Many politicians and other advocates active in the U.S. domestic debate acted out of partisan or other ulte- rior motives — a marked contrast to the 1970s, when the foreign policy issues themselves seemed to be the prime drivers in the U.S. domestic debate. Heading the list was Bill Clinton, who used the China issue to hammer the first Bush adminis- tration — only to reverse course once in office, returning to the engagement policy of his prede- cessor. The sometimes white-hot rhetoric coming from Republi- can congressional leaders critical of the Clinton administration’s engagement policy had similarly partisan motives. Moreover, there was debate over China policy for partisan or other ulterior motives within both political parties at this time. Labor-oriented Democrats used the China issue to discredit the pro-business leanings of the leaders of the Clinton administration, while social conservatives in the Republican Party focused on China’s forced abortions and suppression of religious freedom to embarrass those who favored pragmatic economic engagement with China, and to push them to devote more attention to social issues, both abroad and in the United States. China Debate Trumped by 9/11 Reflecting the fact that there was less serious sub- stantive concern over U.S. policy toward the PRC and Taiwan after the Cold War than during the 1970s and early 1980s, the U.S.-China debate notably subsided during the 1990s whenever the United States faced a serious foreign policy challenge. Thus, the vocal con- gressional debate over China policy stopped abruptly following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and Congress remained quiet about China throughout the U.S.-led “Desert Shield” and “Desert Storm” opera- tions. Once the war was over in 1991, the China debate resumed immediately, with many Democrats in Congress and elsewhere seeking to use the China issue to tear down President Bush’s then strong standing in U.S. opinion polls regarding his handling of foreign affairs. The 9/11 attacks similarly overshadowed the policy debate, which was then focused on the threat to U.S. interests posed by a rising China. This is true even though some in Congress in the preceding year or two F O C U S 28 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 5 The Bush administration shows no signs of backing away from its demonstrated record of punishing those legislators who oppose it on sensitive issues.