The Foreign Service Journal, May 2005

had gone to the extreme of warning of an impending Chinese military take-over of the Panama Canal. Barring such unanticipated events as a U.S.-China flare-up over Taiwan or North Korea, severe economic recession in either the United States or China, or major political instability in China, Sino-American relations seem likely to continue along the track of pragmatic cooperation over the next few years. Both govern- ments give a high priority to seeking common ground and playing down differences as they focus on other important priorities. The Bush administration has its hands full with the complications in Iraq and the broad- er war against terrorism. Chinese leaders wrestle daily with dozens of demonstrations, work stoppages and other manifestations of internal ferment that require constant attention by the Chinese leadership. In recent years, as U.S.-China relations have improved, some media organs, like the Washington Times , some members of Congress and advocacy groups like the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission have resumed efforts to focus on the “China threat.” Such efforts have had little effect. Lobbies at Bay Similarly, pro-Taiwan groups have pushed for more favorable treatment for Taipei without success. Even when President Bush publicly rebuked Taiwan’s pres- ident for his pro-independence initiatives in December 2003, pro-Taiwan forces in Congress were able to muster little support for moves to compel a reversal. With the U.S. already engaged in bloody combat in Iraq and preoccupied with the war on ter- rorism, members of Congress did not want to be in the position of second-guessing the president and commander-in-chief on an issue that could place more U.S. soldiers in harm’s way against China’s large and possibly determined military resistance. This reluctance was underlined by a prevailing U.S. view that the Bush administration had done a good job in maintaining congressional-backed commitments to Taiwan’s security and that the Taiwan president’s pro- independence maneuvers were actually undermining Taiwan’s security. This line of reasoning also means that Congress very likely will strongly back Bush administra- tion opposition to European efforts to end an arms embargo against China. Both Congress and the administration will have little patience with international moves that increase the danger faced by U.S. military personnel already facing death every day in Iraq and in the broader war on terrorism. It seems clear that with careful monitoring and adjustments, the Bush administration should be able to sustain its cur- rent policy vis-à-vis Beijing even if congressional pres- sure for change should mount. To be sure, some politicians, backed by some media outlets and interest groups, will continue to oppose the Chinese regime on a host of issues, particularly its human rights record, the threat posed by China’s military expan- sion, and some of its trade and economic practices. This broad opposition will continue to be a drag on forward movement in bilateral relations, but the rela- tively shallow level of interest in China issues seen over the past decade suggests that congressional opponents will not be prepared to pay the serious costs necessary to pursue those issues forcefully. Those costs will come from several quarters. An ever stronger and more confident China is becoming more adept at using its growing influence against opponents of its interests, whether in the U.S. Congress or elsewhere. For its part, the Bush admin- istration shows no signs of backing away from its demonstrated record of being more serious than any previous U.S. administration since that of Richard Nixon about punishing those legislators who oppose it on sensitive issues. In addition, congressional preoc- cupation with Iraq, the war on terrorism and related issues means that the salience of China-related issues likely will remain low, barring a major disturbance involving Beijing. For all these reasons, members of Congress will find criticism of China less fertile than other fields. Presumably they will therefore leave that turf fallow, at least for the next several years. ■ F O C U S M A Y 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 29 Those who are distrustful of the PRC point to a long list of contentious questions on the bilateral agenda.