The Foreign Service Journal, May 2006

M A Y 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 51 pendence, which insulates it from politics; its precisely drawn mandate and strong leadership that has made full use of the mandate’s authorities; its evenhandedness and professionalism; and a reputation for probity in all areas, including use of resources. Of fundamental importance, both parties are committed to their treaty and want the MFO to be effective. The core of the 1979 Peace Treaty is a tradeoff between Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and security provided by a Sinai demilitarization/limited armaments regime closely supervised by an international operation. The treaty actually stipulates that the United Nations would per- form this peacekeeping role. But because of opposition from the Soviet Union and most of the Arab world, agreement in the Security Council on a mandate was not possible. This inability became final in May 1981, when the president of the Security Council made a formal announce- ment of impasse. Without a peacekeeping operation there, Israel would not withdraw from the Sinai. The treaty was in dan- ger of collapse. Fast action to arrange peacekeepers was essential. Fortunately, Soviet and Arab opposition had been fore- seen and, at Israeli insistence, President Carter had agreed “to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force.” Together, Egypt and Israel, supported by Washington, proceeded to create the MFO. Drafters from the three states quickly completed the protocol that was signed by the parties and witnessed by the United States, on Aug. 3, 1981. The protocol is an unusual document. Functioning as the “constitution” of the MFO, it sets out its mission and organization, including funding parameters. It is also a status-of-forces agreement that establishes the authorities of the director general and codifies the rights of the MFO to carry out its mandate in Egypt and Israel. Beyond the practical difficulties of creating a new civil- ian and military peacekeeping organization from whole cloth and having it operational in the Sinai within seven months, other countries were not enthusiastic about par- ticipating in the enterprise. With strong congressional support, the U.S. administration set a positive example by committing an infantry battalion, a logistics unit and a civilian observer (treaty verification) unit. The United States also agreed to provide the director general, as strongly desired by both parties, and to cover one-third of the organization’s total operating costs. On that basis, the MFO deployed to the Sinai in March 1982 and Israel completed its withdrawal on schedule by April 25, except for a small area around Taba in the south at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. This was resolved by arbitration to Egyptian satisfaction in 1988. How It Works The MFO was set up as a deployed composite military force, commanded by a general officer force commander, with support units and a civilian verification com- ponent, all under the authority of a director general with headquarters in Rome. (Israel and Egypt both balked at setting up headquarters in the other country.) The direc- tor general established represen- tative offices in Cairo and Tel Aviv to perform coordination and polit- ical representation and to serve as purchasing offices. Total MFO strength, including support services con- tractors, is 2,344, with 23 civilians at Rome headquarters, 19 at the Tel Aviv office and 14 in Cairo and 2,288 military and civilians in the Sinai. Military staffing is down over 40 percent since the level at the force’s inception, and head- quarters numbers have dropped by over 55 percent. In 2001, the Department of Defense began urging major cuts in U.S. military participation in the MFO. Fearing that such cuts could unravel the force and create instability, Egypt and Israel strongly resisted. Finally, in 2003, a reasonable U.S. Army reduction package was approved. Nearly 1,700 soldiers from 11 countries serve in the force. U.S. Army troops are still the largest contingent, representing 41 percent of the MFO’s complement; Colombia is next with 21 percent. These soldiers operate checkpoints, observation points and control centers and perform verifications on the ground in the Sinai to imple- ment the 1981 peace treaty’s demilitarization and limited armaments regime. The force commander’s staff has branches dealing with The MFO has played an essential partnership role in helping to build confidence, stability and peace between Egypt and Israel.