The Foreign Service Journal, May 2008

Eritrea). And a few military establishments are impartial, professional and fairly competent, with limited objectives and responsibilities (South Africa, Botswana, Senegal). In any case, almost all African institutions suffer from a lack of resources and equipment. Their leadership struc- ture is often internally incoherent and subject to political interference. Still, compared with other national institu- tions in most of these countries, the military is well orga- nized and adequately funded. Few nations have the wherewithal to operate tanks or fly jet aircraft, but they regularly cough up salaries for the troops. The challenge is sorting out the regime-maintenance function and the bru- tality that occasionally accompanies that from other defense responsibilities, and then judging when and where to draw the line regarding militaries that merit support. Over the years, former colonial powers like Britain, France and Belgium, as well as the U.S. and Russia dur- ing the Cold War, and now China have sought to mod- ernize and professionalize African militaries, with the aim of turning them into smaller replicas of their own estab- lishments. In contrast to earlier years when revolutionary ideology constituted the basis for China’s military cooper- ation with countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, Namibia and Zimbabwe, today Beijing is pushing a full range of military assets, weaponry and aircraft to all buyers. At least in part, this broader approach reflects Beijing’s per- ception that Africa constitutes a growing market, as well as a source of sympathetic partners. Washington continues to provide training and some equipment, such as basic troop kits, communications gear and night-vision devices, but little in the way of sophisti- cated weapons systems. Such limited access to the African military market is unlikely to change, for our offer- ings are simply too complex, expensive and unsuitable for the main tasks confronting the continent’s armed forces. Hard Calls So what can we do? On a case-by-case basis, we already evaluate each country’s military forces and offer the sort of help we deem realistic for its situation. This F O C U S M A Y 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 27