The Foreign Service Journal, May 2016

the Foreign Service journal | may 2016 59 Barry H. Hill, a retired USAID FSO, served as chief of the agriculture and rural development divisions for US- AID in Tanzania (Dar es Salaamand Arusha), Lesotho and Tunisia. Previously he worked for the University of Hawaii in aquaculture and international fisheries development and education. His interest in interna- tional agriculture was sparked during service as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Sierra Leone. H ave we ever considered why project assistance has yet to become institutionalized in many host countries? Are our time frames too short for the aid to take root and generate sustainable progress? Have we ignored key technical resources in the United States that could truly lead to success? Have we missed opportunities to increase farmers’ skills, provide more structure and increase efficiency in their operations? Have we neglected to help build up busi- ness relationships among farmers and the supply chains neces- sary for long-term success? These questions arise from the uneven record of USAID agricultural interventions over the years. In the following discus- sion centered on three case studies, I offer some suggestions and Delivering Foreign Agricultural Aid to Africa: What Works? The record of U.S. agricultural development assistance in Africa over the years is uneven. Here’s how involving agribusiness and trade associations can help. By Barry H i l l guidance for future programming based on my own experience as a USAID Foreign Service officer, observer and evaluator. A Look at the History USAID has traditionally used three entities to carry out its agricultural assistance programs: private-sector contractor firms based in Washington (popularly known as the Beltway Bandits), the U.S. Land Grant Colleges that conduct agricul- ture research, and a covey of nongovernmental organiza- tions (NGOs). Leading this amorphous group were the highly trained, direct-hire USAID agricultural development officers. Toward the end of the 1980s there was still a skilled and qualified staff of agricultural specialists on USAID’s rosters. As the 1990s opened, however, the administration decided to take foreign aid in a different direction. “Democracy and gover- nance” became the priority emphasis in foreign assistance. Confusion reigned at USAID as the agency’s leadership struggled to understand what was expected of it under this new paradigm. Technical personnel began departing the agency as their tasks were marginalized and funding for technical activi- ties diminished. Policy wonks came to predominate. Within five years, the agency had been cleared of the majority of its technical staff. USAID’s credibility—especially overseas—took a nose dive, and a lack of quality project tracking and serious technical errors in judgment and planning came to the fore. Today the powers that be seem to have realized that the feature