The Foreign Service Journal, May 2016

60 may 2016 | the foreign Service journal typical farmer in Africa is not going to be able to practice any kind of “democracy and governance” if they (1) cannot eat, (2) have poor health that prevents them from working, and (3) don’t have the basic education and practical training needed. As it struggles to field meaningful and workable assistance pro- grams overseas, USAID has initiated new efforts to hire techni- cal staff, yet it faces formidable opposition from Congress over the needed budget. In this context, a 1991 proposal by the author and a col- league, then in USAID’s Africa Bureau, may hold promise for more effective agricultural development programming. Tasked at that time with devising, presenting and defending an alterna- tive strategy that involved the private sector (agribusiness) in the African overseas development process, we developed the Africa Bureau Agribusiness Strategy. It consisted of different scenarios for development assistance delivery that involved private-sector agribusiness and agribusiness trade associations. The Case Studies The brief case studies that follow describe three of the projects using our strategy and their results: (1) informal grant funds utilized in unique ways through U.S. agribusiness associations (Tunisia); (2) forward contracting for production of a single commodity in Eastern Africa, with funding from a European private sector agribusiness (Tanzania); and (3) a USAID-funded large-scale, longer-term effort to create and support privately based farmer associations and engage in for- ward contracts with European buyers for high-value specialty horticulture products (Egypt). Case Study 1: U.S. Agribusiness Trade Associations Help Tunisian Producers Increase Output and Marketing The Setting. I was assigned to Tunisia as an agriculture and resource development officer, arriving in late 1992. A new project had just been approved for immediate implementation, but bud- get cuts were expected. Our mission director was told by USAID’s Near East Bureau that funding was not only going to be cut, but that the highly sought project would, in fact, be cancelled. Noting the resulting deterioration in the political climate between the two countries, my mission director and I began to explore possible alternatives. Working closely with the director of the Africa Bureau Technical Group, and with the support of the deputy assistant administrator for the Near East at USAID, we got approval to use $1.5 million of the remaining funds in non-project assistance. The Case. Tunisian producers of tomato paste, olives and olive oil, fish and fish products, and milk products were verti- cally integrated, allowing for smoother melding of production and marketing of the commodities, but in each area there were problems. The Americans were interested in supply chains. Numerous contacts we had made with American agribusiness associations while working on the agribusiness strategy were interested in helping us as we worked closely with Tunisian Ministry of Agriculture field officials. We made contact with the U.S. National Pizza and Pasta Association (which is no longer in existence), and they sent out a marketing expert who quickly diagnosed that the tomato paste can labels were of such poor quality that no one would buy the product. In response, the American association identi- fied another expert in canning and labeling who was quickly able to suggest easy and cheap solutions to the problem. Simi- larly, olive oil and canned and bottled olives were not selling well—either locally in the Sahel, or in Europe. We contacted an olive oil processing association in California, and they dispatched a representative expert. She quickly diagnosed the problem, which was very similar to the can label problems of the tomato paste producers, and worked closely with the bot- tlers and canners to solve it. Building solid relationships between farmers and exporters was the key to project success. COURTESYOFBARRYHILL