The Foreign Service Journal, June 2006

International Church, a stone’s throw from our embassy, and the RSO was clearly concerned about providing secu- rity for a large new assistance program. Fortunately, over time we developed a solid working relationship. He came to see the value of USAID’s pro- grams for the war on terror, and I insisted my staff follow all the RSO’s guidance without exception. But he knew on that first day that if I was going to do my job well, we were going to make it much harder for him to do his. Working in high-threat environments creates a real co- nundrum for USAID and the State Department. On the one hand, foreign assistance, public affairs, political and economic officers need to venture beyond the embassy compound regularly to do their jobs. But chiefs of mission and RSOs are responsible for protecting U.S. lives, even if that means keeping people behind embassy walls. Meanwhile, the rules governing Accountability Review Boards, to which COMs are summoned in the case of death or serious injury, haven’t changed much since 9/11. In places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the threat level would have forced us to evacuate just a few years ago, the U.S. government is actually ramping up development and public diplomacy efforts. We all regret the loss of FSOs in the line of duty, most recently in Karachi, but a zero-tolerance approach to risk, while understandable, is no longer practical. Accountability Review Boards The U.S. Code requires that the Secretary of State convene an Accountability Review Board within 60 days “in any case of serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property at, or related to, a United States government mission abroad, and in any case of a serious breach of security involving intelligence activities of a for- eign government directed at a United States govern- ment mission abroad.” The ARB is instructed to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the security inci- dent and make written findings on: a) the extent to which the incident was security-related; b) whether the security systems and procedures at that mission were adequate; c) whether the security systems and procedures were prop- erly implemented; d) the impact of intelligence and infor- mation availability; and e) other facts and circumstances that may be relevant to the appropriate security manage- ment of U.S. missions abroad. The board then submits its findings to the Secretary of State with recommendations to improve the security and efficiency of the program or operation under review. Perhaps more important to ambassadors and RSOs, the ARB must also make personnel recommendations whenever it finds reasonable cause to believe that an indi- vidual has failed in his or her duty. The board is instruct- ed to transmit the finding of reasonable cause to the head of the appropriate federal agency and recommend that the agency initiate an appropriate investigatory or discipli- nary action. Within 30 days of receiving the recommen- dations of the board, the head of the agency must trans- mit a report to Congress explaining the nature of the case, a summary of the evidence and the decision by the agency to take disciplinary or other appropriate action against that individual — or the reason for not doing so. This is legislation with teeth, with potential for real impact on careers. Patrick Fine, a former USAIDmission director in Afghanistan, has said that facing an ARB is viewed by many ambassadors and RSOs as a “career-end- ing event.” Harry Manchester, USAID’s head of security, likens the ARB to a sword that continually hangs over RSOs’ heads. Ambassador Nancy Powell said at a December 2004 State-USAID conference in Cairo on managing assistance in high-threat countries that COMs and RSOs must now consider proposed activities in a new light: can it be justified as worth the risk in front of an ARB someday, if something goes wrong? As long as the ARB system remains in place, COMs and RSOs will have an incentive to follow the most con- servative approach toward risk — or take all the risk upon themselves. After the devastating December 2004 tsuna- mi, our ambassador to Indonesia found himself between a rock and a hard place. He had to accept full responsi- bility for any security incidents involving official Americans in strife-riven, previously inaccessible Aceh when he decided to allow a few FSOs to work out of a F O C U S 26 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U N E 2 0 0 6 Mark S. Ward is USAID’s Senior Deputy Assistant Admin- istrator for the Bureau for Asia and Near East, with prin- cipal responsibility for South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka). He was USAID mission director in Pakistan from 2002 to 2004, his second posting there. Between January and August 2005, he chaired the agency’s tsunami task force, and since December 2005, he has chaired the agency’s South Asia earthquake task force. Prior to that, he was director of USAID’s Office of Procurement. An FSO since 1986, Ward has also served in Egypt, the Philippines and Russia.