The Foreign Service Journal, June 2006

F O C U S J U N E 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 27 small office in Banda Aceh. His decision has paid great dividends for the U.S. at a critical time in Indonesia, but he had to put his own career on the line in the process. Operating in Critical Environments State Department and USAID officers cannot do their jobs living in fortresses. Much of our success depends on our ability to interact with host-government officials, politicians, academics and community leaders. In Nepal, for instance, the international community has struggled to correctly assess the needs and issues fac- ing internally displaced persons. But the deteriorating security situation has forced USAID to rely heavily on sec- ond-hand information to develop programmatic respons- es. In another instance, a recent Washington Post article strongly criticized U.S. efforts to build and refurbish schools and clinics in Afghanistan, citing our failure to provide adequate oversight and quality control. According to the Post , the delays and deficiencies in this reconstruction program have greatly disappointed our Afghan counterparts and eroded Washington’s credibility, hindering efforts to advance key U.S. objectives. But with greater access to project sites, USAID could have quickly detected and averted some of these problems. The State Department is similarly hindered by strin- gent security protocols, especially because diplomatic suc- cess relies on the ability to meet and build relationships with key government officials and politicians. In the March 2006 Foreign Service Journal , an FSO serving in Baghdad explains that “…often security restrictions keep us overly locked down, where we cannot accurately track or influence events.” It is particularly difficult for public affairs officers to build trust and good will with host-coun- try audiences when they are surrounded by “shooters” whenever they travel — if they get out at all. To make up for the security restrictions, USAID is relying heavily on highly qualified local staff and non- governmental organizations to monitor and implement our programs in high-threat environments. In the West Bank/Gaza, for example, USAID has delegated some pro- gram management to local contractors and Palestin- ian employees, who have greater freedom of movement when border checkpoints are closed. USAID/Sri Lanka relies on local organizations to implement and monitor programs in Tamil-controlled areas where mission staff may not go. We have also developed synergistic relation- ships in conflict areas with U.S. military personnel who can often act as our “eyes and ears” in particularly dan- gerous circumstances. Toward a Long-Term Solution But we will not win the war of ideas in the long term by employing proxies to design, monitor and publicize our programs. I recall a conversation with Sen. Carl Levin, D- Mich., in Islamabad in 2003. I was describing our pro- gram to improve primary schools in Baluchistan, one of Pakistan’s most dangerous provinces. He asked how often I traveled to the school sites. I explained that my travel depended on the security situation at the time and place, but he wasn’t convinced that I was doing enough to “show the flag.” American officers have to be seen, we agreed, even in the most dangerous places. I offer three recommendations to move this issue for- ward. First, and easiest to accomplish, the training for new ambassadors and RSOs should focus on more than the negative consequences of security incidents. Chiefs of mission and DS officers who have served in high-threat environments should be invited to share examples of the creative solutions they employed to manage the trade-offs between security and program success. USAID officers who have developed creative ways to deliver assistance in high-threat environments should do so, as well. A second, tougher, solution is to change the criteria for the ARB. Congress recently amended the Diplomatic Security Act of 1984 to provide a limited exemption from the requirement to convene a board, at the discretion of the Secretary of State, in the event of a major security inci- dent in Iraq or Afghanistan. The amendment acknowl- edged that the old rules should not apply in the war zones in which we now work, a step in the right direction. But the waiver is exercised after the fact, so the COMs in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to have an incentive to be very cautious. In addition, the exception applies only to two of the several high-threat unaccompanied posts where we work today. Finally, we need strong leadership to shift our thinking about risk and establish an appropriate threshold for risk- taking. The first step is opening up the discussion and acknowledging that we are operating in an entirely new paradigm. I hope this article will keep the dialogue going. If we are to achieve our foreign policy goals in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere in the world, we must first accept that only with great risk comes great reward.