The Foreign Service Journal, June 2015

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JUNE 2015 49 stitution, regional conflicts, crony capitalism and lack of institutional modernization. President Getulio Vargas’ domination of politics for a quarter-century, followed by a military dictatorship, is an excel- lent example of the curse of the caudillos. The transition to democracy and institution-building in Brazil began in the 1990s under two presidents, Itamar Franco and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who led democratic modernization by restructuring economic institu- tions. In eight years, Cardoso put Brazil on the road to economic and political modernization, then turned over the presidency to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, his opponent in both previous elections. Despite a radically different background, Lula continued Car- doso’s institutionalization efforts, and after eight years, handed off to Dilma Rousseff, the current incumbent. Under her presidency, Brazil’s transition is showing serious strains from economic set- backs, corruption and protests. What used to be ironically called “the country of the future,” because the future never arrived there, may remain stuck in the past unless it perseveres on its new path. Of all the region’s coun- tries on the institutional path, Brazil has the largest hurdles in its way, and the farthest to go. Caudillo Culture: Venezuela’s Curse Caudillo politics in Venezuela have kept an otherwise wealthy country far poorer than it should be. Arguably, Venezuela’s first free, democratic election was in the 1950s. Since then, Venezuelan leaders practiced personalismo, rather than creating independent, democratic institutions. Today, the economy is in free fall. Oil revenues have plum- meted; inflation is running at more than 100 percent a year; black market currency trades at seven to eight times the official rate; and default on national debt is a near-term likelihood. Venezuela is the lowest-ranked nation in the Western Hemisphere on Transpar- ency International’s corruption list, and suffers from electrical blackouts and horrendous street crime. All this in a country sitting atop the largest reserves of oil in the world. Yet, Chávez’s hapless successor, Nicolás Maduro, wants more power to save Venezuela from external enemies—not internal failures. The tragedy of Venezuela is that it has been addicted to oil for generations. This causes national deliriums of nonexistent wealth and power, and leads to disdain for healthy institutions, discipline and planning. Venezuela should look to neighbors like Colombia and Mexico, which struggle with their own demons, but are far better off. The Maximum Caudillo: Cuba Fidel Castro is the exemplar of a caudillo whose brutal- ity, power and charisma are unmatched by other practitioners of the art. He began with a muddle-minded, leftist ideology before swallowing Marxism- Leninism whole, eliminating rivals, merging his disparate movement with the Cuban Communist Party and allying with the Soviet Union. He is the only caudillo to have made that last mistake. His subversion in the Western Hemisphere and milita- rism in Africa assisted the United States in a relatively successful isolation of Havana during the Cold War. Afterward, most Latin and European nations ignored the embargo and normalized relations with a Cuba weakened and incapable of subversion or militarism. Cold War containment was a global commitment to counter expansionist policies of the Soviet Union wherever possible, including Cuba. Containment of Cuba was also consistent with American diplomacy supporting the Monroe Doctrine. The Soviet challenge to that doctrine and the danger of Castro to the hemi- sphere were demonstrated early, when the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis caused the most dangerous clash of the Cold War, reinforc- ing the value of the policy. Containment and the embargo made strategic sense during the Cold War, but not since. It is futile to argue that Cuba must be isolated, when Russia is a shadow of the USSR, and neither threat- ens the neighborhood. When political reality changes, policy must adjust or become irrelevant. Our policy became irrelevant. Ironi- cally, it isolated us by preventing us from influencing the coming changes in Cuba. Heretofore, we have been hobbled by a peculiar problem. The United States has had no foreign policies with two coun- tries—Israel and Cuba. It has had domestic policies. Relations with these nations have been determined overwhelmingly in the White House and Congress for domestic political reasons, which sometimes coincide with our national security interests. In the past two decades, even when we understood the forces at play in Cuba and attempted to influence them, we were unable to apply coherent policies to achieve our goals. Our national interests The second path, democratic institutionalism, is less firmly rooted in Latin American history, although democratic ideals go back to the independence period.