The Foreign Service Journal, June 2017

24 JUNE 2017 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL countries become willing to assist the United States in security missions elsewhere.” Testifying before a congressional committee in 2013, Admiral McRaven stated: “The direct approach alone is not the solution to the challenges our nation faces today, as it ultimately only buys time and space for the indirect approach. … In the end, it will be such continuous indirect operations that will prove decisive in the global security arena.” Embassies and SOF: Bound Together This wide range of activity, usually implemented by small SOF units with a light footprint, has expanded the U.S. special opera- tions presence throughout virtually every region of the world, in many cases into countries where we have no conventional military forces. In the age of “Chief-of-Mission Authority”—the golden rule that since the 1950s has required all U.S. government personnel and activities in a foreign country to be approved by the ambassador—SOF operations inevitably necessitate close coordination with U.S. embassies. With few exceptions, for both direct action and indirect activities, SOF commanders are required to get the ambassador’s concurrence, seek the embas- sy’s clearance for the entry of SOF personnel and then keep the country team briefed on the status of the mission. Enforcing this rule is becoming a major task for embassies. Direct action missions overseas take place only in exceptional circumstances outside of established war zones, but the campaign to disrupt violent extremist networks in critical threat countries has made them useful in recent years in places like Yemen, Mali, Libya, Somalia and Syria. It has also become quite commonplace for American military personnel to provide advice, intelligence and logistical support for strikes conducted by host-country SOF elements. In such instances, coordina- tion with the State Department and the local U.S. embassy is vital because of the potential for public fallout and impact on the bilateral relationship. Numerous cases highlight the need for close diplomatic-military coordina- tion on kinetic actions that will take place on foreign soil, as well as the potential for serious friction and adverse effects on U.S. foreign policy objectives. Operation Neptune Spear, the 2011 SOF raid in which Osama bin Laden was killed, accomplished its purpose but sparked a protracted crisis in U.S.-Pakistan relations. An operation by a Navy SEAL team targeting the Islamic State group in Yemen late last year caused a backlash. Public knowledge that the United States is involved with direct action missions by foreign partner special operations forces in an undeclared conflict zone—whether in the form of advice, intel- ligence sharing or actual combat support—can lead to negative repercussions within the country and the region. Many foreign partners prefer to keep their relationship with U.S. special opera- tions out of public view for this reason, which helps explain why the details of so many of these partnerships remain classified. The State Department and its embassies have a strong incentive, therefore, to be kept fully in the loop and to retain the ultimate decision-making authority over these activities. Even the choice of which foreign SOF partners to cultivate is subject to political sensitivities and foreign policy consider- ations. Throughout Latin America in recent decades, U.S. special operations engagement with partner forces in countries with poor human rights records deepened historical suspicion and distrust of the United States, sparking concern that those regimes were using what they learned fromU.S. commando training against internal political opponents. In the minds of some critics, U.S.AIRFORCE/MASTERSGT.KENBERGMANN U.S. Army soldiers from the 3rd Special Forces Group help inspect Malian army soldiers’ weapons at their garrison in Tombouctou, Mali, in September 2007, during an exercise to foster relationships of peace, security and cooperation among the trans-Sahara nations. The exercise was part of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, an integrated, multiagency effort of the U.S. State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Defense Department.