The Foreign Service Journal, June 2017

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JUNE 2017 27 Numerous cases highlight the need for close diplomatic- military coordination on kinetic actions that will take place on foreign soil. Adversaries increasingly operate in this “gray zone.” Examples include Russia’s aggressive dissemination of disinformation through social media and other means, Chi- na’s deployment of military vessels disguised as civilian fishing boats and Iran’s harass- ment activities in the Strait of Hormuz that fall short of overt military provocations. All of these countries try to hide their recruit- ment of proxy forces in conflicts around the world. Significantly, General Votel was invited as a special guest to address SOF efforts in the “gray zone” and SOF-embassy relations at last year’s State Depart- ment chief-of-mission con- ference. A fellow speaker, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, praised the effec- tiveness of special opera- tions activities in counter- ing Russian propaganda in that country. Because of its speed, flexibility, and specialized skills and weapons—distinctive capabilities for addressing the “gray zone” and subnational threats that have been pre-eminent since the beginning of the 21st century—it can be argued that special operations represents the wave of the future. While the conventional, general purpose forces of the U.S. military still have a number of important missions in preserving the peace around the world, a full-blown conventional war against the conventional military of a foreign power seems unlikely. Special operations played a far greater role in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq than in any previous war, and the SOF “tip of the spear” raids and other pinpoint strikes were the keys to many of the successes that took place. As Gen. Votel has observed: “In the autumn of 2001, a small SOF element and interagency team, supported by carrier- and land-based airstrikes, brought down the illegitimate Taliban government in Afghanistan that had been providing sanctuary for al-Qaida. This strikingly successful unconventional warfare operation was carried out with a U.S. ‘boots on the ground’ presence of roughly 350 SOF and 110 interagency operatives, working alongside an indigenous force of some 15,000 Afghan irregulars.” Against this backdrop, it is logical for U.S. diplomats to see the special operations commu- nity as a highly adaptable, singularly capable natural ally—and as a primary part- ner in the civilian-military diplomacy of the future. There are undeniably many risks and potential pitfalls ahead. It will be a challenge for the State Department and its career officers to retain primacy over the formulation and implementation of foreign policy in an era when quasi-autonomous military SOF teams are present in more than 100 countries and possess far greater operating resources. The personnel numbers alone are daunting: there are some 70,000 U.S. special operators worldwide, compared to fewer than 10,000 Foreign Service officers. Some fear that the expansion of well-funded U.S. special operations activities into nearly 70 percent of the countries of the world will somehow overwhelm traditional civilian diplo- macy and render it obsolete. This concern overlooks the fact that SOF is ill-equipped to replace many of the key functions of embassies: maintaining a high-level dialogue with host govern- ments on vital bilateral issues, reporting and analyzing political- economic developments, providing assistance to U.S. citizens abroad, and conducting the public outreach and educational and cultural exchanges that embody U.S. public diplomacy. Special operations teams will not usurp these roles. But in a world where asymmetric, non-state extremist net- works and unconventional “gray zone” warfare represent the greatest threat to international security, SOF will have a growing role to play as a foreign policy instrument alongside traditional diplomacy. n U.S.MARINECORPSSGT.RYANDAVIS Marines from a Special Operations Company of the 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion meet with local leaders in the town of Qal’eh-ye Gaz in Afghanistan’s Helmand province to assist with medical needs and discuss their issues with anti-coalition forces operating in the area in August 2007.