The Foreign Service Journal, June 2017

32 JUNE 2017 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL joint and interagency programs, the goodwill that State as an insti- tution derives from those interactions should also not be underes- timated. I was surprised that many of the military officers I met at NDU knew very little about the State Department, and found that many of my FSO colleagues had exactly the same impression. What I found, however, was that the more military officers came to know and understand us, the more likely they were to respect and value the role we play. Having senior officers assigned to NDU is valuable, and our contributions can make a significant difference. For example, we often invited officials from State to speak to students about a particular policy issue, and those sessions can be extremely beneficial to the military officers. Neverthe- less, State often fails to take full advantage of opportuni- ties that are practically on our doorstep. NDU is a 20-minute drive fromMain State (when traffic isn’t lousy), yet it is remarkably difficult to get senior State officials to speak there. In the absence of a senior representa- tive, for example, I routinely stepped in to talk to officers in the CAPSTONE course about chief-of-mission authority and how our embassies abroad operate successfully. Useful—but perhaps not the best use of an opportunity to influence the next generation of DOD leaders. For readers not familiar with it, CAPSTONE is a mandatory, six-week course for newly promoted flag rank officers (OC-equivalent). In keeping with NDU’s joint education mandate, each class includes a roughly equal representation of officers from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, and a handful of civilian coun- terparts. From a strategic perspective, however, the CAPSTONE program is unique in that these classes represent the future of the U.S. military. The men and women in this programwill one day be combatant commanders, filling critical positions at DOD and on the Joint Staff. In CAPSTONE they routinely hear from the top military brass, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agency heads or their deputies and well-known figures in the intelligence community. Yet it was a rarity for anyone from our seventh floor to address this group. The reasons are understandable: packed schedules, long-planned visits from foreign dignitaries, competing speaking engagements, etc. Nonetheless, State could and should use this opportunity to influence the next generation of senior military leaders to much greater effect. The CAPSTONE course is held four times each year; we should give much more attention to the messages we want to send this group. Building relationships and encouraging officers to bond with a new cohort of peers at the senior ranks is one of the goals of CAPSTONE. State could send an officer to every CAPSTONE class, but we haven’t done so for several years because the course is not free. And the cost is significant: $12,000 to $13,000 for six weeks. The long-term benefits, however, could be quite substantial if we view CAPSTONE as an oppor- tunity for State to develop a contingent of officers who can build and sustain relationships with DOD. Participants would have to be carefully selected, ide- ally with a focus on likely future assignments. Giving the opportunity to attend CAPSTONE to somebody who might one day become a deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs or a POLAD to the CENTCOM commander might be well worth the investment. The Way Forward In sum, multiple opportunities already exist for the State Department to deepen personal relationships with U.S. military officers and strengthen institutional links with DOD. Academic settings such as NDU offer one vehicle for doing so and also provide opportunities for State to influence the thinking of future military leaders. Making maximum use of these opportunities is a challenge that will require a sustained commitment from the highest levels of the State Department. But one way State can counteract the “militarization of foreign policy” is to reexamine in a rigorous and honest manner how we motivate Foreign Service personnel to better understand the mili- tary, how we utilize officers who already possess that understand- ing and how we can take full advantage of opportunities—such as the ones at NDU—to demonstrate that a multifaceted approach to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals is far better than one that relies too heavily on just one of the tools in the box. n One way State can counteract the “militarization of foreign policy” is to re-examine how we motivate Foreign Service personnel to better understand the military and how we utilize officers who already possess that understanding.