The Foreign Service Journal, June 2018

34 JUNE 2018 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL our norms work and objectives could aid in early CYBERCOM decision-making. Every international agreement on cyberspace rules of the road for which we get broad support puts limits on state actions against other states. These agreements on “norms” of behavior help elimi- nate potentially devastating actions by states or, at least, make their cost higher because of the necessity to hide their authorship. These norms also ensure broad repudiation of state and nonstate actors who violate them. We’ve seen this with the international reaction to Russian tampering with the U.S. and other nations’ election processes. The work to get broad support for putting limits on acceptable actions against other states in the cyber arena is done largely through the negotiations conducted through the awkwardly titled United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Develop- ments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UNGGE). State leads the UN GGE negotiations for the United States and has achieved some significant successes for U.S. positions. The work done by State and CYBERCOM to defend and advance U.S. interests is on a continuum. State Department offi- cials’ work through the UNGGE helps reduce the range of accept- able damaging actions taken in cyberspace. Well-versed in the challenges of defending U.S. interests, State officers can help ensure CYBERCOM’s tactical brilliance is informed by our broad foreign policy priorities. The partner- ship is essential, and thorough preparation for it by FSOs is necessary for success. n Our expertise, as diplomats, in adapting to new cultures and languages quickly is what makes our role as intimate teammembers so essential.

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