The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2005

L E T T E R S u 8 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U LY- A U G U S T 2 0 0 5 Darfur: We Must Do More The ineffectiveness of U.S. actions and policies was already apparent last December when my Speaking Out column, “The Lessons of Darfur,” appeared. As I noted then, the Sudanese army and police had sur- rounded refugee camps in the wartorn region of Darfur and denied access to humanitarian groups. Seven months later, the situation is no better, yet there has been virtual media silence about this 800-deaths-a-day disaster. Despite one hard-won “agree- ment” and a momentary halt to direct army killings, we’ve seen yet more killings and deaths from starvation and conflict-caused disease. The added African Union monitors and troops have been powerless, unwilling to act or overwhelmed by the task. The U.S. and the United Nations have protest- ed, but to no avail, for Khartoum knew those were empty gestures. Today it is even clearer that what is needed is an immediate international intervention force to put a stop to the killing and to provide safety for the aid workers and civilians. Unfortunately, American leadership has been less than effective and its pronouncements less than honest about how efficacious its past measures were. They took us on a path that did not stop the killing and was not likely to do so. We need a stronger, more coura- geous — if riskier — approach. Clearly the A.U. cannot solve this problem alone, given its lack of logis- tics capabilities and past statements of support for the Khartoum regime. Perhaps the re-elected Tony Blair and President Bush (a necessary player) could make a difference. Earlier, Blair tried to help, and contrary to the gra- tuitous media attacks on him, he remains the sole strong voice in Europe and globally. His election vic- tory may allow him to offer more help for Darfur. But we here in the U.S. must also make our voices clear. All of this argues again for advance U.S. planning and capability to sup- port a United Nations “blue helmet” force. Every day that goes by is a moral indictment of us all. Harry C. Blaney III FSO, retired Washington, D.C. Raising FS Kids It was with great interest that I read the December 2004 article, “Still Haven’t Found What We Are Looking For,” by Mikkela Thompson. As the wife of a Foreign Service officer and mother of a young child, I am trying to learn as much as possible about the effects of this lifestyle on children. This way of life is new to me. I’m a fourth-generation Florida native and lived in the same house all of my life until I went to college. I want to learn as much as I can to help our son through the inevitable transi- tions of diplomatic life. Articles like Thompson’s are an invaluable resource for parents like me. Stephanie Rowlands FS Spouse Guatemala City Oversight for the MCA/MCC The April articles by Elizabeth Spiro Clark and Aaron M. Chassy were interesting, both for what they contained as well as for what they left unsaid regarding oversight of, and accountability for, the Millennium Challenge Account foreign assistance initiative and the Millennium Chall- enge Corporation that oversees it. On the U.S. side, for example, it remains unclear whether, or how, the programs and operations of the MCA/MCC will be subject to the provisions of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. Will the billions of dollars in non-project assistance to be dis- bursed by the MCC be audited by an in-house Inspector General, or will such reviews become the responsibili- ty of another IG (e.g., Treasury, State, USAID), or no IG at all? Presumably, Congress’ own over- sight arm, the Government Account- ability Office, will be able to perform such reviews. IG and GAO reviews of this type of foreign aid (known in the past as budgetary assistance, economic support funds, etc.) are hardly novel undertakings, especially in the experi- ence of audit staffs at the GAO and USAID. Yet the reader is left to spec- ulate on this crucial point that the authors would appear to have either overlooked or considered not worth mentioning. This seems odd given the make-or-break importance that has been attributed to corruption, identi- fied as the most critical among the 16 criteria to be used in granting MCA assistance, as Mr. Chassy notes. Similarly, one is left to wonder what role, if any, recipient countries’ over- sight arms are to play in ensuring the success of this initiative. Ms. Clark would appear to take at face value the assertion made by a former Bolivian presidential candidate that “eradicat- ing drugs had been the sole target of U.S. assistance” to that country. Indeed, drug eradication has been a paramount concern there, because it has been deemed a matter of “vital” interest to the U.S. government. But even the most cursory review of the history of USAID’s diversified eco- nomic and humanitarian assistance to that perennially strife-torn Andean nation would debunk the claim that drug eradication has been Washing- ton’s sole concern. To assert further that because its anti-drug strategy has unfortunately gone awry from time to time, “a backslide in democracy and economic growth” has resulted, is to ignore nearly two centuries of Bolivia’s tumultuous history that might aptly be summarized as “two steps forward,