The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2022

24 JULY-AUGUST 2022 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors.” At the same time, he pointed out, this policy requires “recognizing the present and potential danger from Communist China, and taking measures designed to meet that danger.” Nixon warned: “We could go disastrously wrong if, in pursuing this long-range goal, we failed in the short range to read the lessons of history.” Learning Lessons So what went wrong, and what are “the lessons of history” we now must learn to be able to take the necessary measures to confront China’s “present and potential danger”? I focus here on two critical lessons I have derived over the years. 1. Don’t underestimate the determination and ability of the ruling Chinese Communist Party to maintain its absolute power and resist political change. I believe this is the most fundamental “lesson of history” that we should have learned since U.S. engagement policy began 50 years ago. From the Democracy Wall (1979) and the June 4 Tiananmen Massacre (1989) to the crackdown on the Falun Gong (1999), the Jasmine Revolution (2011) and the Hong Kong Democracy Movement (2019-2020), the CCP has amply demonstrated its determination and ability to stifle political dissent, suppress individual freedoms and resist political change in China. This process notably included the purge of some of its own top leaders, such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s. In fact, even as Deng Xiaoping revived economic reforms after 1989, the CCP actually tightened political control, espe- cially after the collapse of the Soviet Union that year. The CCP has imposed draconian measures in Tibet and Xinjiang in its effort to suppress “separatist” movements among ethnic minorities in China. Under Xi Jinping, the CCP’s quest for control has redoubled and reverted into the economic realm, targeting not only state-owned enterprises but both domestic and foreign private companies operating in China, and expanded into society at large with widespread surveil- lance and censorship and the initiation of “social credit scores” to assess citizens’ political loyalty. Finally, Beijing has put aside Deng’s “hide and bide” caution and begun to flex its increasing economic and military power abroad to advance Xi’s “China dream.” Nonetheless, as an open letter to President Donald Trump in 2019 shows, many China analysts, including former U.S. diplomats, reject an adversarial stance toward Beijing. They continue to believe, as they wrote to Trump, that while China’s “challenges require a firm and effective U.S. response,” the recent measures taken by the United States “are fundamentally coun- terproductive” and contribute “directly to the downward spiral in relations” that “we believe does not serve American or global interests.” In the letter these authors argued that U.S. policy “must be based on a realistic appraisal of Chinese perceptions, interests, goals and behavior,” and that China is not “a monolith, or the views of its leaders set in stone.” They stated: “Although its rapid economic and military growth has led Beijing toward a more assertive international role, many Chinese officials and other elites know that a moder- ate, pragmatic and genuinely cooperative approach with the West serves China’s interests. Washington’s adversarial stance toward Beijing weakens the influence of those voices in favor of assertive nationalists. With the right balance of competition and cooperation, U.S. actions can strengthen those Chinese leaders who want China to play a constructive role in world affairs.” While I, too, want to hold out hope that Beijing will eventu- ally undertake political reforms and adopt constructive policies abroad, I now believe it has become too dangerous to assume the CCP will allow this to happen absent a much stronger—and even “adversarial”—response from the United States and others. In opening our markets and encouraging investments in China, we had assumed an increasingly prosperous and internationally In Beijing on Feb. 15, 1972, China and the U.S. opened official diplomatic relations for the first time since the Communist Party took over China in 1949. From left to right: Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, interpreter Nancy Tang, Chairman of the Communist Party of China Mao Zedong, U.S. President Richard Nixon and U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. KEYSTONEPRESSAGENCY/ZUMAWIRE/ALAMYLIVENEWS