The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2022

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JULY-AUGUST 2022 25 connected Chinese middle class and intelligentsia would even- tually demand political reforms, as we have witnessed elsewhere in Asia, and more cooperative ties with the West. Many were— and continue to be—convinced that the “end of history” and rise of innately superior democracies was and is close at hand. This clearly has not happened, and China has even moved backward under the current CCP leadership. Yet we continued to facilitate China’s economic rise, which allowed the CCP to tout the “Beijing model” to its own people (“socialismwith Chinese characteristics”) as superior to Western democracies and enabled the CCP to strengthen its internal controls. Ironically, the CCP has now joined with Russia to accuse the United States of adopting a “Cold War approach,” while further mobilizing nationalist senti- ments to support its aggressive foreign policy goals. To arrive at the “realistic appraisal of Chinese perceptions, interests, goals and behavior” demanded by critics of the Trump policy, it might also be useful for us to look back at the CCP’s long history of violent political struggles, such as the anti-rightist campaigns of the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s. Reviewing this history up to the present should strongly suggest that political changes will not come about with- out a much more significant pushback, even if this does result in increased tension and a deterioration in relations. Our contin- ued unwillingness to accept this reality and the risks of confron- tation over the years has led us to where we are today. I think it is time to readjust our expectations and consider new measures to confront China’s challenges. 2. Don’t assume that China’s internationalization and growing interdependence with the world will transform it into a “responsible stakeholder.” While Beijing has been open to dialogues and negotiations, we have few results to show for them.