26 JULY-AUGUST 2026 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL there is little need for interagency coordination when the Cabinet members responsible for national security “get along” and are all singularly focused on implementing the president’s vision. To Foreign Service veterans of demanding, last-minute NSC taskers and unrelenting meeting schedules, the current situation—a skeletal NSC headed by a dual-hatted Secretary of State—may seem ideal. It isn’t. And here’s why. The Problem in Context To appreciate the risks of the current situation, some history is useful. Congress created the NSC in 1947 to address deficiencies in U.S. national security policymaking that became evident during World War II. First, believing that a tragedy like the bombing of Pearl Harbor could have been prevented with better information sharing among various branches of government, Congress sought a mechanism that would break down informational stovepipes. Further, Congress aimed to reduce insularity in presidential national security decision-making, which had characterized President Franklin Roosevelt’s tenure and left Vice President Harry Truman uninformed on critical matters, including the development of the Manhattan Project. Finally, in recognition of the United States’ leading post-WWII role in the world, Congress created numerous new national security entities, including the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency. In the NSC, Congress established a mechanism that would allow the president to get the best advice and coordinated recommendations possible from this new and expanding national security enterprise. The legislation establishing the NSC is barebones, allowing each president to tailor its structure to their specific foreign policy decision-making style, typically outlined in an administration’s first national security–related policy directive. While the NSC structure adapts to the needs of each administration, over time the system we call the NSC has evolved into four distinct components: (1) the senior-level meeting of national security Cabinet officials when chaired by the president; (2) the formal interagency policy process from Sub-Policy Coordinating Committees (Sub-PCCs) to Deputies Committee (DC) and Principals Committee (PC) meetings; (3) the professional and expert NSC staff, mostly detailed from other executive branch agencies, including State, who manage the interagency process and staff the national security adviser and president; and (4) the intimate, informal circle of advisers, whether inside or outside government, who have the president’s ear on national security. Effective policymaking requires a balance among these four pillars: If any becomes too dominant or too weak, the system can break down, resulting in suboptimal policy outcomes, or worse. The NSC in Action In most administrations, National Security Council meetings chaired by the president are relatively infrequent and are usually the result of a long deliberative process about only the most consequential national security issues. Such meetings are serious business—for example, President Barack Obama held a series of NSC meetings in 2011 to discuss and ultimately approve the special operation that resulted in the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden. These meetings allow principals face time with the president and the chance to offer assessments, advice, and recommendations that reflect the expertise of their agencies. Principals raise objections, deliberate courses of action, and discuss risk. When such meetings don’t happen, are performative, or are dominated by one agency or official, decision-making procedures and policy outcomes suffer. Expertise isn’t shared. Frustrated Cabinet officials may resort to getting their message to the Kelly Adams-Smith with President Barack Obama in his motorcade, 2011. COURTESY OF THE BARACK OBAMA PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
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