THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JULY-AUGUST 2026 27 president and to the public in other ways, including via leaks and social media. A serious NSC meeting (and the process leading up to it) could, for example, have focused our leadership on the need to develop clear political aims for the recent attack on Iran; matched ways with means; established expectations with allies; evaluated costs and risks, including to U.S. citizens in the region; and resulted in clear, coordinated messaging about our actions and goals. The multilevel interagency process leading up to a National Security Council meeting is just as important as the NSC meeting itself. From Sub-PCCs at the deputy assistant secretary level to PC meetings at the Cabinet level, this is where the rigorous analysis and debate of U.S. foreign policy options take place. Traditionally, decision-making is urged at the lowest level possible, and only intractable issues are elevated to the next higher level. It is this kind of informed decisionmaking that could have allowed the Pentagon and Department of Homeland Security to deconflict use of new anti-drone technology while balancing the FAA’s safety concerns. Of course, there is such a thing as too much process. If the cadence of meetings does not allow for adequate preparation or if meetings become a substitute for decision-making and action, the process overwhelms policy. Good policy demands a rational process. The NSC staff size fluctuates from administration to administration, based not only on the president’s needs but also on how staff are counted. President Obama’s NSC staff was relatively large at about 300 staffers, but this reflected the integration of the Homeland Security Council into the Obama NSC. Some administrations include Situation Room, records management, and administrative staff in their headcount. Others do not. When the NSC staff becomes too small, too large, or is left without proper oversight, the policy system can break down. An NSC staff that is too small cannot develop the expertise or breadth needed to adequately coordinate among large specialized departments and agencies while also staffing the president and national security adviser. An NSC staff that is too large may tend to “overcoordinate,” usurping responsibilities that might normally reside in the rest of the executive branch. An NSC that is left without proper oversight can “go operational,” with dire consequences like the Iran-Contra affair during the Reagan administration. Finally, while every president has a “kitchen cabinet” of trusted, informal advisers— some expert, some not—their impact on national security depends on the effectiveness and strength of the formal National Security Council process. If the other three pillars of the NSC are strong, the kitchen cabinet can serve as a helpful, additional sounding board for the president. But when informal “national security counselors” replace the formal NSC almost entirely, it undermines interagency coordination and results in uninformed, uncoordinated national security policy. The gold standard of National Security Council structure and operation is widely considered to be the “Scowcroft model” created by President George H.W. Bush’s national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft. The model consists of a “fair” national security adviser (NSA) who has the trust of the president and the respect of the other NSC members. The NSA serves as an honest broker, avoids the limelight, and is an unbiased coordinator of the various policy recommendations of agency representatives. The NSA chairs a regular schedule of PC meetings, and the deputy NSA chairs a similar set of DC meetings. This process develops multiple options for the president, rather than The national security adviser, Marco Rubio, serves double duty as Secretary of State, a dual-role structure not seen since the 1970s. Kelly Adams-Smith testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during her confirmation hearing to become U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Moldova, May 9, 2024. COURTESY OF KELLY ADAMS-SMITH
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