The Foreign Service Journal, September 2003

Mr. Gingrich seems to think that intelligence should be tailored to ideology, not reality. How appropri- ate, then, that INR intelligence was vindicated in July when the adminis- tration declassified part of a National Intelligence Estimate which showed that the bureau was “highly dubious” about allegations that Iraq had sought uranium from African countries — a caveat that the president’s speechwriters ignored in preparing this year’s State of the Union address. Worse, Mr. Gingrich’s solution, is not better facts, nor better diploma- cy, but better communications. “As the world’s only superpower, largest economy, and most aggressive cul- ture, the United States inevitably infringes on the attention and inter- ests of other peoples and nations. A country this large and powerful must work every day to communi- cate what it is doing. The world does not have to love us, but it must be able to predict us.” In his view, that means keeping track of “global anti- American sentiment,” which means “left-wing nongovernmental organi- zations, elite media, and most of the elite academics around the world (including the United States).” The BBC is as suspect as Al-Jazeera, he says. He doesn’t use the word pro- paganda, or agitprop, but that is what he means. “The state-to-state diplomatic system of the past simply will not survive,” he concluded. Culture Shock and Awe To adapt the Foreign Service to this new reality, Mr. Gingrich asserts, “the State Department needs to experience culture shock, a top-to-bottom transformation that will make it a more effective com- municator of U.S. values around the world, place it more directly under the control of the president of the United States, and enable it to pro- mote freedom and combat tyranny. Anything less is a disservice to this nation.” He derives his authority to prescribe this medicine from the fact that he served as a member of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman. This is the panel whose February 2001 report called for the formation of a Department of Homeland Security and predict- ed a major terrorist attack on U.S. soil. It also called for significant reforms in the State Department, he points out. But he completely misrepresents the findings of the commission in this regard, for it calls for a stronger State Department, with a greater role in the formulation and execu- tion of foreign policy. It views “with alarm” the consolidation of foreign policy-making in the National Security Council (noting that the national security adviser position was not created by the National Security Act of 1947) and a power shift from State to the NSC and other bodies, such as the Defense Department. As a result, State has been starved of funds, and morale problems have worsened, further damaging the department’s ability to function. The commission then sets out a program for reform and restructur- ing, designed to support State’s reestablishment as the president’s principal foreign policy-making and implementing institution. (Mr. Gingrich suggests many of these same reforms in his speech and arti- cle, but, as noted, for a different institutional mandate.) The com- mission does not view the era of state-to-state diplomacy as over: “U.S. ambassadors and embassies play critical roles in promoting U.S. national security goals overseas,” it says, and it wants the authority of ambassadors to be strengthened. The report concludes: “We cannot emphasize strongly enough how crit- ical it is to change the Department of State from the demoralized and relatively ineffective body it has become into the president’s critical foreign policy-making instrument.” An instrument, not a loudspeaker. I am reminded of a column that Art Buchwald wrote when a similar reform effort was suggested, during the Reagan administration, in which he said, “If they got control of Foggy Bottom, they could force diplomatic solutions to military problems.” Patriotism and Professionalism Four years after Evan Galbraith left Paris to resume a comfortable business career, the Berlin Wall fell. But while the China hands 40 years earlier were blamed for the faults of Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek and the erection of the Bamboo Curtain, those who staffed the embassies and consulates behind the Iron Curtain under incredibly trying circumstances were never credited for their role in containing commu- nism — a policy that was the idea of 66 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 3 Mr. Gingrich cites his service as a member of the Hart-Rudman Commission, but he completely misrepresents that body’s recommendations.