The Foreign Service Journal, November 2003

16 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 3 The Middle East Road Map: Going Nowhere Fast B Y R ONALD S PIERS S PEAKING O UT I n 1967, I was political counselor at Embassy London. Shortly after the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War and the subsequent adoption of U.N. Resolution 242, requiring with- drawal of Israel from territories occu- pied in the war in exchange for peace and recognition from Arab govern- ments, I was asked to speak at the British Royal Defense College on what could be done to resolve the underlying conflict. My view then was — and remains today — that the conflict could not, and would not, be resolved if it were left to the two parties to work out. Leaving the parties to proceed on their own in working out details was tantamount to handing a veto to the extremists on either side: the Israelis who wanted to “transfer” the Palestinians and absorb territory con- quered in the war, and the Palestinians who would never be reconciled to the existence of an Israeli state. It is a formula that guarantees the peace process remains only that: a process, with peace remaining an ever-reced- ing goal. Over the years I have spoken and corresponded with many Israelis and Palestinians who have reached the same conclusion. I proposed then that the U.S. and Britain move quickly to convene a group that would include France and the Soviet Union, preferably with the United Nations’ blessing, to spell out the full elements of an equitable resolution and present it to the two sides on a take-it-or-leave- it basis. Those who accepted it could count on the support and assistance of the U.N. and the sponsoring powers; those who reject- ed it would forgo further economic, political or security support. The recent convening of the Quartet (the U.S., the European Union, the U.N. and Russia) was a constructive step in that it widened participation in the process and thus the sources of encouragement and pressure on both sides. But the so- called “Road Map” is too much just the “same old, same old” to lead to a solution. It is too vague in its details and too general as to its end result, leaving too much to the two parties to fight out between themselves, even with help and encouragement from Quartet members. Accordingly, the Quartet should stop pussyfooting around and present the sides with a clearly defined outcome. Such an outcome could, in my judgment, be acceptable to the mainstream in both Israel and Palestine if firmly presented in the name of the international community. A clear picture of what is expected to lie at the end of the tunnel would help the parties avoid bogging down in the intricacies of who does what, when, and in what order. Of course, the extremist Israelis of the far right and the settlers’ lobby would scream bloody murder, as would Palestinians of the Hamas persuasion. However, it is also clear that these groups are a minority on both sides, although each has demonstrated enough political heft to impede development of a settlement between the parties themselves. Furthermore, the imbalance of power between the parties is too great to make negotia- tions other than a conversation between drastically unequal players: F-16s, tanks, bulldozers and heli- copters vs. rocks, rifles, suicide bombers and a ruined infrastruc- ture. The situation has become more difficult since 1967 due largely to the Israeli settlement policy of “creating facts on the ground.” (When Henry Kissinger once complained to Golda Meir about settlements and the obsta- cles they present to peacemaking, she reportedly answered, “Henry, why do you think we put them there?”) A similar obstacle is the claim that the Occupied Territories are not “occu- pied” but only “disputed,” which flies in the face of U.N. Resolution 242’s reference to territories “occupied in the recent conflict.” It also violates the The so-called “Road Map” is too much just the “same old, same old” to lead to a solution.