The Foreign Service Journal, November 2003

provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which makes deliberate- ly changing the demographics of an occupied area by an occupying power illegal under international law — a view clearly confirmed by the State Department’s legal authorities in 1978. The Way Ahead I believe the path I advocated in my address to the Royal Defence College in 1967 continues to be valid, and that the intervening his- tory of the conflict during the past decade, from the Oslo Accords to the Road Map, supports the con- tention that a more definitive out- side intervention is indispensable to a settlement. As I said then, such a settlement should consist of the fol- lowing six elements: 1. Israel must withdraw fully from the West Bank and Gaza to the 1967 Green Line. Any border rectifica- tions must be mutually agreed and any territory retained by Israel should be balanced by territory of equal area and value transferred to the Palestinians. 2. Palestine would be a demilita- rized state, and a major international economic reconstruction program that will give Palestinians a stake in a reordered Middle East would be initi- ated. The Israeli contribution could be considered partial compensation for its confiscation of property of Palestinians who were expelled or fled the conflict in 1948 and thereafter. 3. Jerusalem must be a shared capital. Israel’s unilateral and unrec- ognized 1967 annexation and expan- sion of the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem would be annulled. Water resources should be equitably shared, and Palestine would control its own aquifers. 4. The Palestinian “right of return” should be limited to no more than a reasonably small number (e.g., 50,000) based on family reunification considerations. 5. An international peacekeeping force should be installed as a buffer at the border until both sides agree its presence is no longer necessary or desirable. 6. The settlement and the security of each party would be “guaranteed” by the U.N. and the sponsoring pow- ers, which should include the United States and major Arab neighbors. To these, a seventh point must be added today: Israeli settlers electing to remain in Palestine should do so as Palestinian citizens, just as Arabs who remained in Israel after 1948 have become Israeli citizens. On both sides these minorities should enjoy full rights of citizenship. I believe anything less than this will not fly; neither will anything more. There is no doubt that these provisions would be equally unpalat- able to extremists on either side, but I also believe they would be greeted with relief and support by the main- stream majorities of both countries. Since, unfortunately, extremists either control the government, or are dispro- portionately influential, on both sides, the suggestion that such a proposition should be put to popular referenda may have merit. But until the interna- tional community puts forward a clear view of an equitable final settlement, the political dynamics of the Middle East will just lead the RoadMap to the fate of all its predecessor efforts. Active leadership is urgent. We cannot continue to hide behind ambiguity, letting each side proceed with almost diametrically opposed interpretations and understandings of the vague end-point provisions of the Road Map. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon implies returning no more than 40 percent of the Occupied Territories, with such circumscribed authority as to make Palestine a col- lection of Bantustans. (Interestingly, the most eloquent critics of this vision are themselves Israelis.) What the Likud leadership thinks of as a Palestinian “state” is far removed from what Palestinians seek, yet we continue to obscure the differences in a fog of language. We must con- front the differences, and the Quartet must declare its position firmly. This is politically difficult, but leadership consists of facing up to the “tough decisions” politicians so love to talk about making. In the meantime, neither side is willing or able to take the first small steps while so much confusion is left about what they are leading to. Paradoxically, even the very process of “negotiation” is increasing mutual dis- trust and producing crisis after crisis. We have seen this repeatedly in recent weeks, with the resignation of Palestine Prime Minister Abu Mazen, the intensified Israeli campaign against Arafat, the continuation of N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 3 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 17 S P E A K I N G O U T Leaving Israel and Palestine to proceed on their own guarantees the peace process remains only that: a process, with peace remaining an ever-receding goal.