The Foreign Service Journal, September 2009

26 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 9 Consistent with the political strategy, the diplomat will need to mentor host-government officials on ways to enhance the efficiency of their administration. He may be asked about longstanding property disputes between tribes that have delayed agreement on a proposed development scheme. She will re- view project proposals with devel- opment officers and may help negotiate the terms with local contractors. He will assess the strengths and weaknesses of local security and intelli- gence officials, and make recommendations to senior gov- ernment figures about personnel changes that are supportive of the overall political strategy. She will receive petitions from villagers seeking the release of a fellow tribesman they feel is being unjustly held by government security forces. Thus, in a counterinsurgency the diplomat will be called to act as mentor, tribal affairs adviser, program offi- cer, negotiator, analytic reporting officer and, not least, envoy. The challenge of assuming multiple, new roles is el- evated to an altogether higher level in counterinsurgency since it occurs in the middle of a live, lethal conflict. Far from pursuing post-conflict reconstruction and stability (a misnomer, to this author’s way of thinking, in the context of a counterinsurgency), the diplomat-counterinsurgent will conduct mid-conflict mentoring, program formulation, negotiation, reporting and advocacy. The diplomat’s tra- ditional approach to preventing or resolving conflict will necessarily evolve into a focus on securing the population, reducing levels of violence and winning the war. At no point during an insurgency will the diplomat have the luxury of waiting for security conditions to improve. The need to identify and mobilize the local population against the insurgents will be immediate and constant. To increase chances for success, diplomats must adopt an ac- tive approach that empowers provincial administrators and local leaders. Maximize Contact with the Local Population Armed with a comprehensive political strategy, fluent in the history and workings of a province, and inclined to help shape desired political outcomes, the diplomat will be- come even more effective by spending every possible wak- ing hour with local leaders, officials and residents. In many traditional societies, personal relationships hold the key to getting business done. Making the effort to build relationships — sitting for long hours drinking green tea or coffee, and simply listening —will make a profound difference in the working relationships that the diplomat will need to succeed. At the same time, it is a question of numbers. In a given district or province there will likely be thousands of troops, but only a few diplomats. So to make progress on the political track, the diplomat will need to circulate widely and aggressively. He or she will need to be in many places at once. On occasion, the imperative to maximize contact with the local population will conflict with a bureaucratic pre- disposition to secure the diplomat in hardened facilities, well away from threats. Yet the diplomat-counterinsur- gent who remains ensconced in a small fortress, relying on regularly scheduled meetings “outside the wire,” will never reach his or her full potential within the broader coun- terinsurgency campaign. Instead, diplomats should make every effort to take overnight, circuit-riding trips through districts. The goal should be to capitalize on the military presence in remote areas to reach groups important to the political strategy. District administrators, local religious leaders and village elders — whose support is vital to successful counterin- surgency warfare — should know the diplomat and wel- come his or her arrival. Time to Build a Cadre Some readers may say that this article posits the cre- ation of a hybrid diplomat-warrior, a mythical figure who simply does not exist. Such criticismwould fall wide of the mark. Forty years ago, American diplomats were integral members of combined civilian-military teams that pursued rural pacification and development in Vietnam. While his- torians will continue to dispute the overall success of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program and its effect on the outcome of the VietnamWar, few contest the proposition that, where effectively imple- mented, the CORDS program led to a diminution in insurgent violence. So there is precedent for successful F O C U S The diplomat’s starting point is to craft a strategic narrative explaining the purpose of all U.S. government plans and programs in the country.