As Secretary Rubio presses ahead with his reorganization of the State Department, insights from a central player in State’s previous reform effort give food for thought.

BY MAREN BROOKS

When taking office in 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken inherited a department that was weak and demoralized from the previous administration’s hiring freeze, the pandemic, and bad managers. Blinken had a vision for modernizing the Department of State. Using existing reports (from the Council on Foreign Relations and the Belfer Center, for example) that provided a road map on needed reforms for the department, Secretary Blinken and his leadership team, in particular then–Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources Brian McKeon, developed an agenda for modernizing the department, which the Secretary outlined in October of that year in a speech at the Foreign Service Institute.

Secretary Blinken’s agenda for modernization encompassed five pillars: ensuring the capacity and expertise within the department to confront the critical missions of today and in the future; promoting initiative and innovation across the Foreign Service and Civil Service; taking care of people to deliver a diverse, dynamic, and entrepreneurial workforce; modernizing technology and the use of data; and “reinvigorat[ing] in-person” diplomacy—or said another way, managing risk. Importantly, the reform agenda sought to empower the workforce and bureaus’ leadership to advance the necessary changes, as opposed to bringing in outside consultants.

Over the next few years of implementing the agenda, we made important progress. Under the leadership of the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources and in close partnership with the Secretary’s deputy chief of staff, I identified critical stakeholders within the department who could deliver on the Secretary’s vision. I co-chaired the Modernization Executive Steering Committee, bringing colleagues from Global Talent Management, Budget and Planning, Management Strategy and Solutions, Strategic Planning, Information Resource Management, and the chief data officer’s team, in particular, to identify opportunities and challenges to progress and build mechanisms to track our accomplishments.

As I reflect on our efforts, I am proud of what we accomplished, while being all too aware of the ongoing challenges of reform at State.

Important Accomplishments

Under Secretary Blinken’s leadership, the department launched the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy, created a new Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy, and established the “China House” to help integrate all China policy issues across the department and to better interface with similar constructs in other federal departments and agencies.

For the workforce, we implemented a tool to objectively evaluate positions for telework opportunities; launched paid internships (broadening the talent pool through early recruiting); and established a Retention Unit to understand why employees stayed—and why they left—to help inform other workforce reforms. We also launched the Professional Mobility Development Program for civil servants to be able to move to new opportunities more flexibly.

We made important gains in our work on modernization, though we did not make all the changes we had hoped.

State invested in technology, including delivering “tech for life.” Prior to this, employees had to turn in their tech (phones and laptops) every time they changed bureaus or posts. With “tech for life,” the department inched into the 2010s, ensuring that officers could have a single mobile phone number throughout their career.

Finally, the department looked for ways to better manage risk. For years, there was low tolerance for risk, especially since the tragic events in Benghazi in 2012, when four diplomatic personnel were killed in the line of duty: Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens, Information Officer Sean Smith, and security personnel Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods. Guided by the modernization efforts, State launched an aggressive engagement with Capitol Hill to allow for more flexibility in where and how we were able to conduct in-person diplomacy.

We made important gains in our work on modernization, though we did not make all the changes we had hoped. The most significant challenges we faced were an intense resistance to change in State, a pervasive risk-averse culture, State’s contentious relationship with Congress, and politics.

Significant Challenges

Resistance to Change. Change is hard. As much as members of the Foreign Service in the Department of State embrace calls for reform of broken and ineffective systems, most of them have figured out how to navigate those systems and are concerned that changes would negatively affect their ability to advance. Changes, including creating more opportunities for civil servants, developing pilot programs for recruiting and hiring FSOs at the mid-level, and finding ways to recruit and retain a more diverse workforce, were met with resistance.

Within the Foreign Service, I found a strong culture of “putting in the time.” FSOs take years from their first tour to get to mid-level, and achieving the rank of Senior Foreign Service is even harder. This journey—and the badge of honor one earns for surviving it—can mean a stifling of innovation at more junior levels because they are not considered to have had enough experience to offer new perspectives.

As different generations enter the workforce, that resistance to change will create challenges in recruiting and retaining new and top talent. State should survey the career interests and goals of incoming and entry-level Foreign and Civil Service members to inform policies and processes that help with retention and recruitment. Partnering with AFSA, the department could also continue to look for ways to modernize the Foreign Service personnel system to create more opportunities for promotion and advancement.

Confronting professional risk intolerance was an important part of our modernization agenda. And a hard one to tackle.

Risk Intolerance. Risk is inherent in the job of advancing U.S. interests and relationships around the globe. From at least Vietnam on, physical danger has threatened members of the Foreign Service. The 1983 terrorist bombing of the Beirut embassy and the 1998 bombing of embassies in East Africa prompted legislative efforts to protect diplomats and U.S. embassies. Congress mandated security standards for new embassies, including “setbacks” that made it harder for terrorists to attack but also more difficult for local people to engage with embassy officials and vice versa. Since the September 11, 2012, terrorist attack in Benghazi, in particular, FSOs have increasingly been restricted in their movement and engagements in certain areas.

Risk-taking to advance U.S. interests and relationships is an inherent part of the job and is necessary for innovation and evolution. As part of our efforts on modernization, we engaged State’s congressional stakeholders to urge changes to the laws that mandated restrictive security standards for embassies overseas. We sought innovative ways to open new embassies or consulates, including looking to co-locate with allies in certain countries.

At State, however, risk intolerance extends beyond concerns for physical danger. While policy successes are celebrated, failures are feared to be career-ending; and this can lead to knee-jerk reactions that discourage innovative thinking. The 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan is a good example. Earlier that summer, U.S. Embassy Kabul had signaled (through a “dissent” cable) that it believed the timeline for the Taliban takeover was much shorter than others were estimating. Yet little was done to expedite withdrawal. Though I believe the evacuation was a success—more than 120,000 people were evacuated in about a month’s time—the prevailing sentiment in Washington (and in Congress, in particular) was that it was a failure. After-action reviews followed, and many feared there would be a hunt for a scapegoat.

Confronting this professional risk intolerance was an important part of our modernization agenda. And a hard one to tackle. The Secretary championed a reinvigorated Dissent Channel and the creation of a “policy ideas channel,” encouraging employees at all levels to submit recommendations on policies and stimulate discussion about policy successes and challenges. Some employees took advantage of these tools, but we did not see wide engagement. I heard, informally, that managers were dismissive of the policy ideas channel, in particular, and were likely dissuading entry-level officers from feeling empowered to submit ideas.

In 2022 I joined conversations with the Secretary, both Deputy Secretaries, and other seventh-floor leaders who talked about risks they had taken in their careers. We sought to capture these stories and created posts on our modernization website, trying to demonstrate that innovation and creative ideas—whether they succeed or not—were welcome.

While we tried to encourage innovation in policy development and execution, there were no obvious incentives or awards for such ideation, and for members of the Foreign Service, the risks outweighed the benefits. State should continue to find ways to engage staff at all levels to think creatively about how to confront the challenges of today and the future, and find ways to reward innovative ideas.

State’s congressional overseers notoriously do not like the State Department, and the feeling is mutual.

Congress. State’s relationship with Congress is fraught. The relationship between the department and its congressional oversight committees is, at best, adversarial, creating obstacles in partnering to solve State’s challenges.

Following the tragedy in Benghazi, Congress launched investigations into the events. While ultimately the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found no wrongdoing, there were critiques of State’s security practices, and several State whistleblowers testified before Congress. Similarly, following the complicated—and chaotic—withdrawal from Afghanistan, Congress was highly critical of State’s “failures.” Such negative attention on State’s gaffes differs from how Congress generally treats the failures of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the intelligence community (IC), and this has acted to heighten State’s risk intolerance.

State’s congressional overseers notoriously do not like the department, and the feeling is mutual. I cannot identify the origins of the distrust between the two, but I keenly observed the impact. In other roles, I have observed, for instance, that DoD and the IC are uniquely transparent with their congressional overseers—they try to share “early and often” operational activities, including failures. By leaning into the relationships, they have built trust over time. So while there can be disagreements and tension in their relationships, the defense and intelligence committees on the Hill work to understand the communities they oversee.

By contrast, State is often reluctant to lean too far forward with its congressional committees, having learned that doing so can generate aggressive inquiries, congressional micromanagement, and nit-picking. At the same time, State’s congressional overseers do not know State. When the Secretary notified Congress of his intent to establish the Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy, the appropriations committees in both the House and Senate placed a hold on the notification. Over several months, I participated in multiple briefings with committees’ staff in which we had to explain some very basic principles about the State Department, how it was organized, and what benefits would be derived from bringing together disparate global health–focused staff into one bureau, under one leader.

Congress’ State overseers demonstrated very little understanding of how State worked, and they did not trust the State officials trying to clarify and correct misunderstandings. One issue being debated was the reporting structure for the new bureau. Several congressional staff members wanted the bureau to report directly to the Secretary, arguing that was the only way to ensure “visibility,” suggesting at times that this reporting structure would include physical proximity to the Secretary, when most members of the bureau were in fact located in a separate building from Main State. The antagonisms between State and its congressional committees breed distrust, secrecy, and frustration on both sides.

Other agencies work differently with Congress. As a deputy assistant secretary for Defense, I had monthly meetings with congressional staff during which we briefed current counterterrorism policies and operations. From the start, I found that the relationship DoD had with its committees was, in general, more transparent, forthcoming, and collaborative, and, in turn, the committees’ staff were respectful and trusting of their DoD counterparts and the information shared.

State has a program through which FSOs can serve on the Hill for a year, and when I left, State was piloting bringing those officers back into the Bureau of Legislative Affairs for a year to benefit from the insights and understanding they gained. I would encourage State and its congressional oversight committees to explore a program that would allow Hill staff to serve in the department for a year to gain a better understanding of the internal mechanics at State.

Having worked at State for more than 13 years and on its reform for nearly two years, I am clear-eyed on the need for changes in the department. But …

Politics. Organizations must constantly evolve. But State is often subject to the whim of shifting administrations, so much so that its evolution is stop/start—discontinuous and jerky. During his tenure, Secretary Blinken and his team oversaw significant changes across the Department of State. His diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, focus on increasing the use of data to inform decision-making, efforts to engage and empower the workforce to innovate and evolve, and reorientation of the department toward the challenges of today (and the future)—all put the department on a trajectory to become an organization that would resonate with the American people and effectively engage with U.S. allies and partners.

The tone and tenor of the new administration put all that at risk. The rejection of DEI principles will hinder State’s efforts to innovate by discouraging a broader segment of society to join up. The Trump administration suspended the paid internship program and the Presidential Management Fellows program, both of which were important tools to recruit new and diverse staff into the department. The disparagement of the workforce will further alienate current employees, stifle innovation and ideation, and hamper recruitment efforts.

The dramatic, rapid reorganization of the department could put critical missions at risk. The previous administration’s focused investment on relationships in the Indo-Pacific, including opening new embassies, seems to have been put on hold, which could upend the progress made in developing those critical relationships. The recent firing of 1,300 employees from the department was jarring and demoralizing. And congressional efforts to significantly cut foreign assistance will inhibit State’s ability to advance soft power, potentially allowing our strategic competitors (e.g., Russia and China) to gain more influence globally, edging out our access to allies, partners, and critical resources.

§

Having worked at State for more than 13 years and on its reform for nearly two years, I am clear-eyed on the need for changes in the department. But thoughtful, deliberate, internally driven change was the approach we took under Secretary Blinken. The effects of the chaotic, rushed, top-down, and politically motivated reforms by this administration remain to be seen. I expect that the department will flounder; may suffer a brain drain, especially at the entry and most senior levels; and will again present to future administrations a department that is in urgent need for deep reform—and modernization.

Maren Brooks was a civil servant in the State Department from 1997 to 2008 (with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs until 2006 and as a special assistant to the under secretary for political affairs her last two years). She then served at the National Counterterrorism Center and, subsequently, the National Security Council, and in 2017 left government. She returned to the State Department in 2021 as a senior adviser to the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources. Her most recent job in government was as the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for irregular warfare and counterterrorism from January 2023 to January 2025.

Read More...

• “Time for a National Conversation” by Sen. Lindsey Graham, The Foreign Service Journal, March 2018
• “On State Reform” by Dennis Jett, The Foreign Service Journal, March 2021
• “Toward a More Modern Foreign Service: Next Steps” by Marc Grossman and Marcie Ries, The Foreign Service Journal, March 2023